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ABSTRACT
Public school teachers have little opportunity for redress if
they are dismissed for their activities on social networking
websites. With the exception of inappropriate communication
with students, a school district should not be able to consider a
public educator’s use of a social networking website for
disciplinary or employment decisions. Insisting that the law
conform to twenty-first century social norms, this iBrief argues
that the law should protect teachers’ speech on popular social
networking websites like Facebook and MySpace.

INTRODUCTION
There have been many recent instances of teachers being
disciplined or terminated for their online activities on social
networking sites. 2 While many recent cases have considered
whether public school districts can restrict students’ activities on
social networking websites, 3 few have considered whether
teachers’ activities on social networking websites may be similarly
restricted. This iBrief will examine the current state of the law
regarding the employment of public educators and their activities
on social networking websites such as Facebook, 4 MySpace 5 and
YouTube. 6 It concludes that the law is outdated and should adapt
to changing technology and culture to allow teachers more
¶1
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J.D. candidate at Duke University School of Law, 2011; B.A. in Political
Science from the University of California, Berkeley, 2007.
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See Ian Shapira, When Young Teachers Go Wild on the Web: Public Profiles
Raise Questions of Propriety and Privacy, WASH. POST, April 28, 2008, at A1,
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1, 2009,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/no_more_pencils_no_more_facebo
oks/.
4
Facebook Home Page, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Aug. 22, 2010).
5
MySpace Home Page, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Aug. 22, 2010).
6
YouTube Home Page, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Aug. 22, 2010).

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 014

freedom of expression on social networking websites without fear
of professional discipline.
I. SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES ARE
PART OF MODERN AMERICAN CULTURE
A. Social networking websites defined
¶2
Social networking websites, such as MySpace, Facebook,
LinkedIn, Twitter, and YouTube, “allow users to create profiles that
include biographical information and pictures. After creating a profile, a
user can network with other users by adding contacts listed in their email address books or by searching for others by name or common
interest.” 7

Social networking websites serve a variety of audiences. For
example, “MySpace is an informal site that attracts a younger audience.
It allows users to post pictures, videos, and music to their profiles and
focuses on helping friends and family stay in touch.”8 One court
described MySpace as:

¶3

[A] website that allows its users to create an online community
where they can meet people. MySpace can be used to share
photographs, journals, and ‘interests’ with mutual friends. People
with MySpace accounts can create a ‘profile,’ to which they can
link their friends, and the owner of the profile can either invite
people to become friends, or other MySpace users can ask the
owner of the profile to become friends with the owner of the profile.
If the owner of a profile accepts another MySpace user as a friend,
the friend’s profile picture is posted on the profile owner’s
MySpace page, along with a link to the friend’s MySpace profile.
The owner of a profile can kick friends off his profile, deleting that
friend’s profile picture from the owner’s profile page. In addition, a
profile owner can completely block other MySpace users from
viewing his profile page. The owner of a profile can post blogs on
his own profile page, allow other MySpace users to post comments
on his profile page, or post comments on other users’ profile pages. 9

7

James Cool & Thomas Young, Do Well by Doing Good: Your Actions in the
Community Speak Louder Than Words. When You Forge Connections with
Community Members, They Will Think Well of You and Your Profession, 45
TRIAL 32, 32–33 (2009).
8
Id.
9
Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297–98 (D. Conn. 2008).
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¶4
Facebook is similar to MySpace “but is more popular with
college students,” while “LinkedIn is packaged as a professionalnetworking site.” 10
¶5
YouTube describes itself as “the world's most popular online
video community, allowing millions of people to discover, watch and
share originally-created videos. YouTube provides a forum for people to
connect, inform, and inspire others across the globe and acts as a
distribution platform for original content creators and advertisers large
and small.” 11

B. Prevalence of use by Americans
¶6
Social networking websites are part of modern American
culture. 12 A recent Nielsen study showed that two-thirds of people who
use the internet visit social-networking or blogging websites, and ten
percent of all time spent online is spent on such sites.13 That same study
also found that social networking websites and blogging have together
become more popular than e-mail. 14 MySpace has approximately 125
million active users each month, including close to 65 million unique
American users. 15 Facebook currently has over 300 million active users,

10

Cool & Young, supra note 7, at 36.
YouTube Home Page, About, Press Room,
http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
12
See, e.g., Harry K. Wong, The Single Greatest Effect on Student Achievement
Is The Effectiveness of The Teacher, Presented to the North Carolina Principal’s
Executive Program (Mar. 16, 2007), available at
http://old.sandi.net/fridaynotes/2009/0227_wong.pdf (“Unlike the baby boomers
and Generation X, who were independent and entrepreneurial (They gave us
Dell, Yahoo, and Google.), Gen Yers are socially adept at working in groups or
teams and are avid users of online social networking, such as MySpace and
Facebook. A learning community is their forte, thus to work collaboratively in a
group is second nature to them.”); see also YouTube Home Page, About, Press
Room, http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet (last visited Nov. 1, 2009) (“52
percent of 18-34 year-olds share videos often with friends and colleagues.”).
13
NIELSON CO., GLOBAL FACES AND NETWORKED PLACES 1 (2009), available at
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/wpcontent/uploads/2009/03/nielsen_globalfaces_mar09.pdf.
14
See id. (“‘Member Communities’ has [sic] overtaken personal Email to
become the world’s fourth most popular online sector after search, portals and
PC software applications.”).
15
MySpace Home Page, Press Room, Fact Sheet
http://www.myspace.com/pressroom?url=/fact+sheet/ (last visited Nov. 1,
2009).
11
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approximately 30% of whom are in the United States. 16 The general
population is very engaged with social networking websites, and teachers
are no exception. Indeed, a study of pre-service teachers found that 98%
of pre-service teachers “were familiar with social networking sites such
as MySpace or Facebook” and 88% of pre-service teachers had a social
networking website account. 17
1. Recognition of Social Networking Websites by the Legal Community
¶7
Even the legal profession has recognized the prevalence and
utility of social networking websites. One legal publication wrote,
“[n]ow, even legal professionals are flocking to Twitter as a chance to
socialize, promote and network.” 18 Some lawyers are now using social
networking websites to “define [their] brand as . . . lawyer[s], an
important concern in a competitive market.” 19 Another legal publication
wrote that Facebook “has a more streamlined interface than MySpace
and offers an intriguing option for attorneys—the ability to develop an
independent profile page for your law practice. Other users can then link
to your firm by becoming a ‘fan’ of the page.” 20 Indeed, the legal
profession’s adoption of social networking may impact the legal
development of social networking speech protections.
2. Educational Uses of Social Networking Websites
¶8
One of the original functions of Facebook was for college
students to share their class schedules with each other. 21 As Facebook
has expanded from colleges and universities to the general public, it has
been adopted by public schools, school teachers and even school
districts. 22 Bernie Rhinerson, the Chief District Relations Officer for
the San Diego Unified School District, stated that he created a Facebook
page for his district in an effort to, among other things, reach out to
16

Facebook Home Page, About, Press, Latest Statistics
http://www.facebook.com/facebook?ref=pf#/press/info.php?statistics (last
visited Oct. 30, 2009).
17
Teresa S. Foulger et al., Moral Spaces in MySpace: Preservice Teachers’
Perspectives about Ethical Issues in Social Networking, 42 J. RES. ON TECH. &
EDUC. 1, 7 (2009).
18
Kelly Phillips Erb, Microblogging: Is Twitter the New Blog?, 31 PA. LAW. 34,
34 (2009).
19
Id. at 35.
20
Cool & Young, supra note 7, at 33.
21
Christian Luspa, Facebook: A Campus Fad Becomes a Campus Fact,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 13, 2006,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1213/p13s01-legn.html.
22
See, e.g., San Diego Unified School District,
http://www.facebook.com/#/SanDiegoUnified?ref=search&sid=1210355.21948
01827..1 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
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employees between the ages of twenty-five and forty who are frequent
users of social networking websites. 23 Mr. Rhinerson also noted the
usefulness of Facebook and Twitter for communicating during an
emergency. 24
A search on Facebook for “elementary school PTA” reveals 385
¶9
Facebook groups and 86 Facebook pages established for the parent
teacher associations of elementary schools to communicate.25 In
addition, at least one high school teacher has set up a Facebook group for
his students’ student council, “because it was much easier to send out
meeting reminders and such.”26 Indeed, communicating with students
through social networking websites “can sometimes be more time
effective and resourceful than what previous generation[s’] teachers used
for communication with students.” 27
Furthermore, social networking websites also promote education
through non-academic uses. For example, groups of students who have
been inspired by their teacher may create a Facebook fan group. While
this group may be made without the teacher’s knowledge or
involvement, it is promoting education by promoting the teacher.
Unfortunately, in some cases the content of these fan groups or websites
may ultimately damage the teacher’s career.28 Thus, regardless of the
potential benefits of teachers connecting with their students through
social networking sites, not all employers view this increased contact as a
positive step.
¶10

23

Allen Young, San Diego Unified Enters New Frontier with Facebook and
Twitter, School Innovations and Advocacy, Nov. 18, 2009 (on file with author).
24
Id.
25
Facebook.com,
http://www.facebook.com/search/?q=elementary+school+pta&init=quick (last
visited Nov. 1, 2009).
26
Askville.com by Amazon,
http://askville.amazon.com/SimilarQuestions.do?req=give+Mobile+number+fac
ebook (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
27
Julie Mack, Is It Okay for Teachers to Add Students as Facebook Friends?,
http://hubpages.com/hub/Teachers-Add-Students-Facebook-Friends.
28
See, e.g., Social Networking: The Good, the Bad and the Funky, 94 AM. TCHR.
1 (Sept. 2009); Facebook.com,
http://www.facebook.com/search/?init=srp&sfxp=&q=Mr.+Lane#/group.php?gi
d=2223987941&ref=search&sid=1210355.240850809..1 (last visited Nov. 1,
2009).
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II. OTHER SETTINGS
A. Student Discipline
¶11
Numerous lawsuits have been filed and decided in recent years
throughout the country on the issue of whether public schools violate
students’ rights by punishing them for off-campus use of social
networking websites. 29 Legislation has even been introduced in
Connecticut that “would prohibit public schools from disciplining
students for online posts, unless the remarks threatened others.”30 This
legislation was introduced by Connecticut State Senator Gary LeBeau in
response to Doninger v. Niehoff, in which a Connecticut high school
student was disqualified from running for student council due to the
student’s post on a blog. 31 Also, a number of legal journals have
published articles discussing public school students’ First Amendment
rights on social networking websites. 32

B. Private Sector Employment
¶12
Employers frequently use social networking websites to screen
potential employees. 33 For all employees without protective contracts or
collective bargaining agreements, “[i]n the absence of strong protections
for employees, poorly chosen words or even a single photograph posted
online in one’s off-hours can have career-altering consequences. 34 A
new term, dooced, has been coined to refer to being fired for speech

29

See, e.g., Wendy Davis, No More Pencils, No More Facebooks, A.B.A. J.,
July 1, 2009,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/no_more_pencils_no_more_facebo
oks/.
30
Id.
31
See 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
32
See, e.g., Kathleen Conn, Cyberbullying and Other Student Misuses of
Technology Affecting K-12 Public Schools: Will Public School Administrators
Be Held Responsible for the Consequence?, 244 ED. LAW REP. 479 (2009);
Kevin P. Brady, Student-Created Fake Online Profiles Using Social Networking
Websites: Protected Online Speech Parodies or Defamation?, 244 ED. LAW
REP. 907 (2009).
33
See, e.g., Daniel Abasolo, Fired for Facebook, THE BATTALION, June 28,
2006,
http://media.www.thebatt.com/media/storage/paper657/news/2006/06/28/Opinio
n/Fired.For.Facebook-2118962.shtml.
34
Randall Stross, How to Lose Your Job on Your Own Time, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
30, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/business/30digi.html.
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35
The word dooced was first used
online, especially writing on blogs.
after Heather Armstrong, the author of dooce.com, was fired for writing
about her work on her personal website. 36 She gives the following
advice to readers of her website: “BE YE NOT SO STUPID. Never
write about work on the internet unless your boss knows and sanctions
the fact that YOU ARE WRITING ABOUT WORK ON THE
INTERNET.” 37 Another term, Facebook Fired, refers either to being
fired due to use of a social networking website or to actually being fired
via a social networking website.38

Unlike public-sector employees, private-sector employees have
no First Amendment protection from discipline or termination resulting
from their speech. 39 Private-sector employees do have some statutory
protections though, such as anti-discrimination laws, whistleblower
protections, and labor laws. 40 Also, private sector employees who have
been terminated due to their activities on social networking websites can
file lawsuits pursuant to the federal Wiretap Act41 and the federal Stored
Communications Act (SCA). 42

¶13

35

Kerry Maxwell, dooced, MACMILLAN ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2005),
http://www.macmillandictionaries.com/wordoftheweek/archive/050131dooced.htm.
36
Id.
37
Posting of Heather B. Armstrong to http://www.dooce.com/about.
38
Proofpoint: Email Security Blog, Dooced, Twerminated, Facebook Fired:
Lingo and Facts about Social Media and Employee Terminations, Sep. 02,
2009, http://blog.proofpoint.com/2009/09/dooced-twerminated-facebook-firedlingo-and-facts-about-social-media-and-employee-terminations.html (last visited
Nov. 30, 2009).
39
See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“It is, of course, a
commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only
against abridgment by government, federal or state. Thus, while statutory or
common law may in some situations extend protection or provide redress
against a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free expression
of others, no such protection or redress is provided by the Constitution itself.”)
(citation omitted); see also Philip L. Gordon & Kevin P. O’Neil, The Legal
Perils of Social Media & Social Networking: Questions & Answers,
WORKPLACE PRIVACY COUNS. (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://privacyblog.littler.com/2009/10/articles/social-networking-1/the-legalperils-of-social-media-social-networking-questions-answers/#more.
40
W. Va. Emp’t Law Letter, Responding to Employee’s Personal Social
Networking, HRHERO.COM, http://www.hrhero.com/hl/092509-socialnetworking.html?TOPIC.
41
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006).
42
Id. §§ 2701–11.
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¶14
One example of such a lawsuit is that of Brian Pietrylo and
Doreen Marino who together filed a lawsuit against their former
employer, Hillstone Restaurant Group, alleging violations of the federal
Wiretap Act, the SCA, New Jersey state laws, wrongful termination in
violation of public policy, and common law invasion of privacy. 43 The
allegations of wiretapping were dropped and the other allegations were
heard by a jury. 44 Mr. Pietrylo and Ms. Marino were employed as
servers at Houston’s, a restaurant owned by the Hillstone Restaurant
Group. 45 They were fired for comments they posted in an invitationonly chat group on MySpace, which was accessed by their managers at
Houston’s without authorization.46 The managers of the restaurant
accessed the MySpace chat room after receiving the MySpace login
information from Ms. St. Jean, another employee at Houston’s. 47 Ms. St.
Jean testified that she had felt pressured to turn over her login
information to her boss. 48 On appeal, the court held that the jury “could
reasonably infer from such testimony that Ms. St. Jean’s purported
‘authorization’ was coerced or provided under pressure,” and that the
Houston’s managers’ accessing of the chat room was not authorized.49
The jury found the defendant not guilty of violating Mr. Pietrylo’s and
Ms. Marino’s common law rights to privacy, and the jury therefore did
not reach a verdict on the allegations of wrongful termination in violation
of public policy. 50 However, the jury did find the defendant guilty of
violating the state and federal Stored Communications Acts and awarded
damages to Mr. Pietrylo and Ms. Marino. 51 Accordingly, in certain
circumstances, it is possible for private sector employees to succeed in
lawsuits against former employers who terminated them for their use of
social networking.

Indeed, the monitoring of employee’s social networking website
use is a contentious issue over which employees and employers hold
very different views. A recent study by Deloitte analyzed this issue and
produced interesting, although not startling results.52 Of the more than

¶15

43

Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Group, No. 06-5754, 2009 WL 3128420, at *1,
(D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at *3.
48
Id.
49
Id. at *3.
50
Id. at *1.
51
Id.
52
Deloitte LLP 2009 Ethics & Workplace Survey Results, Social networking
and reputational risk in the workplace (2009), available at
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two thousand working adults and five hundred business executives
surveyed, 60% of the executives said that “they have the ‘right to know’
how employees portray themselves and their organizations online,” while
53% of the employees said that “‘social networking pages are none of an
employer’s business.’” 53 Almost one third of the employees surveyed
responded that they “never consider what their boss would think before
posting materials online,” 54 and 61% of employees surveyed responded
that they would not alter their social networking profiles or activities
even if their boss was monitoring their profiles or activities.55

III. SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES
AND PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES
A. Public Sector Employment Generally
Public sector employees are limited in terms of judicial recourse
following termination or discipline by employers in response to
statements made by the employee on social networking sites.
¶16

1. Under Color of State Law
¶17
As public employers are state officials, public employees may
pursue claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State . . . subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
¶18
To win on a § 1983 claim, the “plaintiff must establish that a
person acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal right.”56

A plaintiff who makes a First Amendment or due process claim
under § 1983 “may seek related injunctive relief—such as reinstatement

¶19

http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/About/EthicsIndependence/article/8aa3cb51ed812210VgnVCM100000ba42f00aRCRD.htm
(last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
53
Id. at 2.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 6.
56
Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999).
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to remedy past violations—against state actors in their official
capacities.” 57
2. Fourteenth Amendment
¶20
If terminated unfairly for content posted on a social networking
site, public employees, such as public school teachers, likely cannot
bring a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, the
Supreme Court held that “the class-of-one theory of equal protection
does not apply in the public employment context.”58 The Court stated
that:
There are some forms of state action . . . which by their nature
involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of
subjective, individualized assessments. In such cases the rule that
people should be “treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions” is not violated when one person is treated differently
from others, because treating like individuals differently is an
accepted consequence of the discretion granted. In such situations,
allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out of a
particular person would undermine the very discretion that such
state officials are entrusted to exercise . . . This principle applies
most clearly in the employment context, for employment decisions
are quite often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array
of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify. . . . [T]reating
seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in the
59
employment context is par for the course.

3. Limitations on First Amendment Free Speech
¶21
Until the 1960s, it was assumed that a person relinquished some
of his or her First Amendment rights by becoming a public employee. 60
Indeed, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, “[t]he
policeman may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.” 61
This assumption began to change when, in Pickering v. Board of
Education, the Court held that a public employee could not be summarily
fired for uttering constitutionally protected free speech. 62 In Pickering,
¶22

57

Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943, at
*30 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008) (citing Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 630 (3d Cir.
1990)).
58
128 S. Ct. 2146, 2151 (2008).
59
Id. at 2154–55.
60
See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 143–44 (1983).
61
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
62
391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968).
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the Court formulated a balancing test to weigh a teacher’s speech as a
public employee against the interests of the employer. 63 The Court stated
that courts need to “arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern, and
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees.” 64
¶23
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, the Court further recognized the rights of free speech held by
public employees, holding that “First Amendment rights, applied in light
of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to
teachers and students.” 65 As in Pickering, the Court emphasized the need
to balance interests and noted “the need for affirming the comprehensive
authority of . . . school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to . . . control conduct in the schools.”66
¶24
Refinement was made to the Pickering balancing test in Connick
v. Meyers when the Court introduced the “public concern” test. 67 The
Court noted that “[f]or at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state
cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the
employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of
expression.” 68 However, the Court also acknowledged the “evolvement
of the rights of public employees, and the commonsense realization that
government offices could not function if every employment decision
became a constitutional matter.”69 The Court held that in order to trigger
Pickering balancing, the speech in question must be made by the public
employee as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, as opposed
to as an employee on a matter of private interest. 70 Indeed, according to
the Court, a public employee’s speech on matters of private concern does
not receive First Amendment protection, and the “federal court is not the
63

Id. at 568.
Id.
65
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
66
Id. at 507.
67
461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).
68
Id. at 142.
69
Id. at 143.
70
Id. at 147. Until recently, public employees in California were thought to
have broader protections of free speech under California’s Constitution. Kaye v.
Board of Trustees of the San Diego County Public Law Library, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d
456, at 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) considered the case of a publicly employed
librarian who was terminated after sending his colleagues emails critical of his
employer. The librarian unsuccessfully argued that the emails were protected
under the free speech clause of the California Constitution. Id. at 464. The
court held that the public concern test used by the Supreme Court applies to
public employees’ speech in California. Id.
64
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appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision
taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s
behavior.” 71 The Court stated:
When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,
government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their
offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of
the First Amendment.
Perhaps the government employer’s
dismissal of the worker may not be fair, but ordinary dismissals
from government service which violate no fixed tenure or
applicable statute or regulation are not subject to judicial review
even if the reasons for the dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or
72
unreasonable.

Even if an employee’s speech is on a matter of public concern,
their constitutional right may nonetheless be trumped by the interests of
efficiency in public service. 73 Courts consider the content, form, and
context of the speech to determine if it on a matter of public concern. 74
Importantly, Mr. Meyers spoke at the office, but the Court acknowledged
in a footnote that “[e]mployee speech which transpires entirely on the
employee’s own time, and in nonwork areas of the office, bring different
factors into the Pickering calculus, and might lead to a different
conclusion.” 75
¶25

If a public employee is fired and wishes to pursue a claim that
¶26
his or her termination was the result of his or her exercise of
constitutionally protected speech, he or she must show probable cause.76
In Mandell v. County of Suffolk, the Second Circuit stated that prior to
applying the Pickering balance test, a plaintiff must establish that: “(1)
his speech addressed a matter of public concern, (2) he suffered an
adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection existed between
the speech and the adverse employment action, ‘so that it can be said that
his speech was a motivating factor in the determination.’”77 If a plaintiff
succeeds in providing evidence of these three elements, a public
employer may still avoid liability either by “demonstrating by a
71

Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
Id. at 146.
73
See id. at 150.
74
Id. at 147–48.
75
Id. at 153 n.13.
76
D. Duff Mckee, Termination or Demotion of a Public Employee in Retaliation
For Speaking Out As a Violation of Right of Free Speech, 22 AM. JUR. PROOF OF
FACTS 3D 203, § 19.
77
316 F.3d 368, 382 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102,
110 (2d Cir. 1999)).
72
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preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same adverse
action in the absence of the protected speech,” or by showing that the
“plaintiff’s speech was likely to disrupt the government’s activities, and
the likely disruption was ‘sufficient to outweigh the First Amendment
value of plaintiff’s speech.’” 78
Indeed, although public employees no longer must forgo all First
¶27
Amendment rights for employment, public employers may still restrict
employees’ speech in ways that would be unconstitutional if they were
private employers. 79

B. Public Education
1. What Makes Public Education Unique?
¶28
Although public school teachers are protected under the First
Amendment, they are often held to a high moral standard by their
surrounding communities. Holding teachers to a high moral standard is
nothing new. A 1915 set of rules for unmarried female teachers includes
prohibitions on smoking cigarettes, dressing in bright colors, keeping
company with men, loitering in front of ice cream stores, and wearing
fewer than two petticoats.80 Similarly, an 1872 set of school rules states
that “[a]ny teacher who smokes, uses liquor in any form, frequents pool
or public halls, or gets shaved in a barber shop will give good reason to
suspect his worth, intention, integrity and honesty.” 81 Today, state
certification procedures reflect this antiquated notion with prohibitions
from “[e]ngag[ing] in conduct which would discredit the teaching
profession.” 82 The majority of state teaching licenses contain moral
codes that teachers must follow. 83
Across the United States, teachers have been suspended and fired
for their postings on social networking websites. 84 One example is Ms.
Tamara Hoover, who was fired from her job as an art teacher at an

¶29

78

Id. at 382–83 (quoting Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2001)).
See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004).
80
Rules for Teachers—1915, New Hampshire Historical Society,
http://www.nhhistory.org/edu/support/nhgrowingup/teacherrules.pdf (last visited
Nov. 22, 2009).
81
School Rules—1872, New Hampshire Historical Society,
http://www.nhhistory.org/edu/support/nhgrowingup/teacherrules.pdf (last visited
Nov. 22, 2009).
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Unprofessional and Immoral Conduct, ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R7-2-1308
(2008), available at http://azsos.gov/public_services/Title_07/7-02.pdf .
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Kellie Hayden, Teachers & Social Networking Sites, SUITE101.COM, May 18,
2008, http://www.suite101.com/content/teachers-social-networking-sitesa54245.
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Austin, Texas high school after school officials viewed artistic pictures
of Ms. Hoover, which her female partner had posted on Flickr.com. 85
The school characterized the photos, some of which showed Ms.
Hoover’s breasts, as pornographic, although the Houston Chronicle
described them as “no more erotic than the statue of David.”86 The
school district claimed that they terminated Ms. Hoover “because the
photos were inappropriate and violat[ed] the ‘high moral standard’
expected of public school teachers.”87 The district further argued that
Ms. Hoover ceased to be an effective teacher because the photos were
accessible to students. Former colleagues of Ms. Hoover disagreed
sharply with the district on this point.88 The questions that arise from
stories like Ms. Hoover’s are whether we, the public, should care about
what teachers do in their personal lives; and if so, how do teachers’
personal lives really affect their classroom behavior? 89
A Washington Post article commented on “the crudeness of
some Facebook or MySpace teacher profiles” and asked: “Do the risqué
pages matter if teacher performance is not hindered and if students,
parents and school officials don’t see them? At what point are these
young teachers judged by the standards for public officials?” 90 As that
article pointed out, “these are adults, many in their twenties, who are
behaving, for the most part, like young adults.” 91

¶30

One school district in particular, Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Schools, has been particularly intolerant of its employees’ postings on
social networking websites. 92 At least four teachers, of CharlotteMecklenburg Schools have faced disciplinary action due to their social
networking website activity. 93 One of these teachers was fired after
¶31

85

Stephen Rothberg, Texas Teacher Fired for Posting Topless Photos On-line,
COLLEGERECRUITER.COM (June 19, 2006, 7:08 AM),
http://blog.collegerecruiter.com/blog/2006/06/19/texas-teacher-fired-forposting-topless-photos-on-line/.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Ana Kasparian, Should Teachers get Fired Based on the Content of their
Facebook?, POL.EDUC. EXAMINER, June 24, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/x5445-Politics-in-Education-Examiner~y2009m6d24-Should-teachers-get-firedbased-on-the-content-of-their-facebook.
90
Shapira, supra note 84.
91
Id.
92
See, e.g., Mario Roldan, Another CMS Teacher Faces Termination Over
Facebook Post, WCNC.COM, Nov. 1, 2009,
http://www.wcnc.com/news/local/68701507.html.
93
Id.
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describing her workplace on her Facebook profile as “the most ghetto
school in Charlotte.” 94 However, as a spokesperson for the teacher
explained, the teacher did not intend to cause offense, and the school in
question actually fits the definition of “ghetto,” as “it is in a part of the
city in which members of a minority group live, especially because of
social, legal or economic pressure.”95 A spokesperson for the school
district articulated the position that “if an employee can’t be seen as a
role model, they shouldn’t be teaching.” 96 In the district’s view, “[i]t’s
really not a matter of free speech. It’s a matter of professional judgment
or the lack thereof.” 97 Although it certainly is a matter of professional
judgment, it most certainly is also a matter of free speech.

IV. RECENT CASES
¶32
Few teachers have filed lawsuits protesting professional
discipline or termination resulting from their use of social networking
websites. The parties in each of the few cases on the subject advanced
similar arguments and achieved similar results.

A. Spanierman v. Hughes
¶33
Jeffrey Spanierman was employed by the State of Connecticut,
Department of Education as an English teacher at Emmett O’Brien High
School in Ansonia, Connecticut.98 The principal of the school learned
that Mr. Spanierman communicated with students through his MySpace
page about “homework, to learn more about the students so he could
relate to them better, and to conduct casual, non-school related
discussions.” 99 The principal conveyed to Mr. Spanierman that “he had
exercised poor judgment as a teacher” by connecting with students
through MySpace. 100 Because of his use of MySpace, Mr. Spanierman’s
101
contract for employment was not renewed.

Mr. Spanierman sued the school officials under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging violations of his First Amendment freedoms of speech and
association, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural

¶34
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Id.
Worker Fired Over Facebook Posting, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 26, 2008,
available at
http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2008/nov/26/worker_fired_over_facebook
_posting63089/.
96
Roldan, supra note 92.
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Id.
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Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297 (D. Conn. 2008).
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Id. at 298–99.
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Id. at 299.
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102
and substantive due process and equal protection under the law. The
court found that Mr. Spanierman’s First Amendment claims failed as a
matter of law103 and granted summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants on all of Mr. Spanierman’s claims. 104

Mr. Spanierman claimed that his interest in the renewal of his
teaching contract was a property interest within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 105 but the court found that it was not.106 The
court held that “[i]n the employment context, a property interest arises
only where the state is barred, whether by statute or contract, from
terminating (or not renewing) the employment relationship without
cause.” 107 Mr. Spanierman did not have tenure, but argued that
Connecticut’s Teacher Tenure Act 108 nonetheless provided him with a
protected property interest.109
¶35

Rejecting Mr. Spanierman’s argument, the court found that his
employment was governed by a union agreement, and not the Teacher
Tenure Act. 110 Nothing in the union agreement indicated “that the nonrenewal of a non-tenured teacher’s contract [could] be done only for just
cause.” 111 Furthermore, the Connecticut Department of Education had
fully complied with the agreement by giving Mr. Spanierman proper
notice and granting his request for a hearing. 112 Therefore, the court held
that Mr. Spanierman had been afforded procedural due process. 113 Also,
as he failed to establish a protected property right in the renewal of his
employment contract, his substantive due process claim failed as a matter
of law. 114
¶36

102

Id. at 297.
Id. at 314.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 301; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
106
Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 303.
107
Id. at 301 (quoting S & D Maint. Co., 844 F.2d at 967).
108
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-151 (2010).
109
Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 301–02 (noting that the result would have been the same if the Teacher
Tenure Act had applied to Mr. Spanierman).
112
Id. at 302.
113
Id. at 303.
114
Id. at 304; see id. at 303 (“In order to prevail on a substantive due process
claim, the plaintiff must first establish the existence of a ‘federally protected
property right,’ which requires a demonstration of a clear entitlement to a
benefit under state law.”).
103

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 014

¶37
Also under the Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Spanierman claimed
that he had been denied equal protection of the laws, as he was the only
teacher in his school system to have “suffered adverse employment
action because of his or her choice of a particular website for lawful
electronic communications.” 115 The court noted that his equal protection
claim was based on the theories of a “class-of-one” and “malicious
prosecution.” 116 Thus, the court held that this claim failed, because the
class-of-one theory “‘does not apply in the public employment
context,’” 117 and it is doubtful whether the malicious prosecution theory
still applies in the public employment context.118 Even if the malicious
prosecution theory remains viable, Mr. Spanierman failed to “compare
himself to a similarly situated employee for the purposes of his . . .
claim,” which is necessary to succeed on such a claim. 119 Mr.
Spanierman compared himself to two teachers at Emmett O’Brien who
also have MySpace profiles; however, the court found this comparison
insufficient, as Mr. Spanierman did not present any evidence as to
whether the teachers in question interacted with students via
MySpace. 120

The court held that Mr. Spanierman’s speech on his MySpace
profile, except for a political poem, was not protected by the First
Amendment, as it was not on matters of public concern. 121 The court
also found that action was taken against Mr. Spanierman by his former
employers because his “conduct on MySpace, as a whole, was disruptive
to school activities.” 122 Mr. Spanierman’s exchanges with students over
MySpace “show[ed] a potentially unprofessional rapport with students,
and the court [could] see how a school’s administration would
disapprove of, and find disruptive, a teacher’s discussion with a student
about ‘getting any’ (presumably sex), or a threat made to a student (albeit
a facetious one) about detention.” 123 The court further held that:
¶38

It is reasonable for the Defendants to expect the Plaintiff, a teacher
with supervisory authority over students, to maintain a professional,
respectful association with those students. . . . Plaintiff would
communicate with students as if he were their peer, not their
115

Id. at 304 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 305.
117
Id. at 306 (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2151
(2008)).
118
Id. at 307.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 310–11.
122
Id. at 312.
123
Id.
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teacher. Such conduct could very well disrupt the learning
atmosphere of a school, which sufficiently outweighs the value of
Plaintiff’s MySpace speech. 124
¶39
Additionally, the court held that Mr. Spanierman had “failed to
establish a causal connection between his poem and the decision to not
renew his employment contract.” 125 Even if he had established a causal
connection between his protected speech and the non-renewal of his
contract, Defendants would have nonetheless prevailed, according to the
court, because “the Defendants would have taken the same adverse
action even in the absence of the poem, and . . . Plaintiff’s speech was
likely to disrupt school activities.” 126

Regarding Mr. Spanierman’s First Amendment freedom of
association claim, the court stated that it was “unsure as to whether
MySpace can properly be considered an ‘organization’ for the purposes
of this analysis.” 127 The court found that even if MySpace “could be
considered an organization for First Amendment purposes, there [was]
no evidence . . . that MySpace, as an organization, purports to speak out
on matters of public concern.” 128 The court further stated that even if
Mr. Spanierman had established that “his association with MySpace
involved a matter of public concern[, he] would still need to show that a
causal connection existed between the expressive association and the
adverse employment action.” 129

¶40

B. Snyder v. Millersville University
¶41
Ms. Stacey Snyder was assigned to complete a student-teacher
program at Conestoga Valley High School in January 2006. 130 Prior to
the program, she had received the Millersville University Guide to
Student Teaching, which states that Millersville University student
teachers are required to “‘maintain the same professional standards
expected of the teaching employees of the cooperating school’ and to
‘fulfill as effectively as possible every role of the classroom teacher.’”131
Also, during her student teaching orientation in January, Ms. Snyder was
cautioned “not to refer to any students or teachers on [her] personal

124

Id. at 313.
Id.
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Id.
127
Id. at 314.
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Id.
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Id.
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Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943, at
*7 (E.D. Penn. Dec. 3, 2008).
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132

webpages.” By spring of 2006, Ms. Snyder was teaching a full load of
courses at Conestoga Valley High School. 133 Ms. Snyder received midplacement evaluations from her University advisor and Mrs. Reinking,
her “cooperating teacher” at Conestoga Valley, which indicated a
concern
for
“proper
teacher-student
boundaries”
and
“unprofessionalism.” 134
Ms. Snyder did inform her students that she had a MySpace
webpage, and she was aware that many of her students also had
MySpace webpages. 135 In May of 2006, Ms. Snyder became aware that
one of her students had viewed her MySpace page.136 She confronted
this student and testified that it was “‘inappropriate’ for her student to
look at a teacher’s MySpace account because ‘there’s a boundary line
and there’s personal information on there that the student should know
not to look at as a student.’” 137 Ms. Snyder then posted the following
statement on her MySpace page:
¶42

First, Bree said that one of my students was on here looking at my
page, which is fine. I have nothing to hide. I am over 21, and I
don’t say anything that will hurt me (in the long run). Plus, I don’t
think that they would stoop that low as to mess with my future. So,
bring on the love! I figure a couple of students will actually send
me a message when I am no longer their official teacher. They keep
asking me why I won’t apply there. Do you think it would hurt me
138
to tell them the real reason (or who the problem was)?

The post also included a picture of Ms. Snyder “wearing a pirate
¶43
hat and holding a plastic cup with a caption that read ‘drunken
pirate.’” 139 Ms. Snyder testified at trial that the “photograph and caption
had an entirely personal meaning” and that the “posting was not directed
at any CV administrators or anyone that she had ‘professional contact
with . . .’ but was ‘really directed to her best friends.’” 140
This post proved controversial for a number of reasons. For one
¶44
thing, another Conestoga Valley teacher accessed Ms. Snyder’s MySpace
page, saw the posting and showed the posting to Mrs. Reinking. 141 Mrs.
132

Id. at *12.
Id. at *8.
134
Id. at *7–11.
135
Id. at *13.
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Id.
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Id. at *13–14 (internal citations omitted).
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Reinking read the post and interpreted the last two sentences of the post
to be about her,142 as she was aware that Ms. Snyder did not have a high
opinion of her. 143 Furthermore, Mrs. Reinking “thought that it was
inappropriate for a student teacher to invite her students to view a
photograph of herself drinking alcohol.” 144 Mrs. Reinking proceeded to
report the posting and her interpretation of the posting to her supervisor
who subsequently instructed Ms. Snyder not return to the school until her
final evaluation. 145
At her final evaluation, Ms. Snyder was shown and questioned
about her MySpace posting, which was described as “unprofessional.” 146
The evaluators, including Ms. Snyder’s Millersville University studentteaching advisor, were concerned about both the “drunken pirate”
photograph and the text of the posting. 147 Millersville University
“backed the school authorities’ contentions that her posting was
‘unprofessional’ and might ‘promote under-age drinking.’” 148 In her
final evaluation, Ms. Snyder received an unsatisfactory rating in the area
of professionalism, and the evaluation noted that she had “evidenced
some aspects of poor judgment during the Semester, especially in regard
to one specific instance.”149 As a result of Ms. Snyder’s unsatisfactory
completion of the student-teaching program, Millersville University
awarded her a Bachelor of Arts degree in English instead of in
Education. 150
¶45

Ms. Snyder filed suit against five Millersville University
administrators individually and in their official capacities, alleging that
the school administrators violated her First Amendment right to freedom
of expression and her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due
process under color of state law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 151 She
alleged that the administrators of Millersville University “violated her
rights because the MySpace posting ‘played a substantial part’ in both
their decision to deny her the BSE and their ‘refusal to take the necessary
¶46

142

Id.
See id. at *12.
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Id. at *16–17.
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Id. at *19–20.
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Id. at *20.
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Randall Stross, How to Lose Your Job on Your Own Time, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
30, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/business/30digi.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Ho
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Snyder, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943, at *20.
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152
Ms.
steps’ to ensure that she received PDE teacher certification.”
Snyder “sought monetary damages from Defendants in their individual
capacities and injunctive relief from Defendants in their official
capacities.” 153

On a motion for summary judgment, the judge ruled that the
¶47
claims against the defendants in their individual capacities were barred
by qualified immunity. 154 A non-jury trial was conducted on Ms.
Snyder’s claim for mandatory injunctive relief against the administrators
in their official capacities.155
Ms. Snyder asked the court to compel the defendants to award
¶48
her a Bachelor of Science degree in Education as well as the teaching
credits necessary for her to pursue teaching certification from the
Pennsylvania Department of Education. 156 The court found that the
defendants lacked the legal authority under Pennsylvania law to give her
a BSE degree, because she had not fulfilled the student-teaching
requirement. 157 Therefore, the court held that Ms. Snyder’s request for
injunctive relief necessarily failed, because “‘[a] claim for injunctive
relief can stand only against someone who has the authority to grant
it.’” 158 Her failure to satisfactorily complete student teaching also made
her ineligible for teaching certification by the Pennsylvania Department
of Education. 159
The court treated Ms. Snyder as a teacher, rather than a student,
¶49
and held that the defendants did not violate her First Amendment right to
freedom of expression, because her expression on her MySpace page was
on matters of private concern.160 As a public school teacher, in order to
succeed on a First Amendment claim of freedom of expression, Ms.
Snyder had the burden of proving that her expression was on a matter of
public concern. 161 By her own admission, Ms. Snyder’s expression on
MySpace was on purely personal matters, and therefore is not afforded
protection by the First Amendment. 162 The court held that the
152
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Id. at 30–31 (citing 22 PA. CODE §§ 49.82(b)(2), 354.25(f) (2010)).
158
Id. at *32 (quoting Williams v. Doyle, 494 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1024 (W.D.
Wis. 2007)).
159
Id. at *35.
160
Id. at *42–43.
161
Id. at *39 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, at 147 (1983)).
162
Id. at *42.
153

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 014

“[d]efendants’ response to the posting thus did not violate Plaintiff’s
First Amendment rights.” 163

C. Murmer v. Chesterfield County School Board.
¶50
Mr. Stephen Murmer was employed as an art teacher at Monacan
High School in Chesterfield County, Virginia. Mr. Murmer was
terminated after school administrators became aware of a YouTube video
in which he appeared. With the assistance of the American Civil
Liberties Union he brought legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
First Amendment against the school board, the principal of the school
and the Associate Superintendent for Human Resources of Chesterfield
County Public Schools. 164

The YouTube video in question showed a clip of Mr. Murmer’s
¶51
October 2003 appearance on a cable television show called “Unscrewed
With Martin Sargent,” in which Mr. Murmer discussed and demonstrated
his artistic technique of painting with his buttocks while wearing a
swimsuit. 165 He never discussed his artistic technique at school or with
his students and even appeared on the show in disguise and under the
name Stan Murmur. 166 Also, Mr. Murmer did not personally post the
video to YouTube. Mr. Murmer was “terminated solely because of the
YouTube video and students’ and teachers’ alleged reaction to it, and not
for any reasons relating to his performance as a teacher.” 167 The school
administrators who fired Mr. Murmer contended that the YouTube video
caused disruptions at Monacan High School. 168 The defendants also
admitted that “one of the reasons for terminating the Plaintiff’s
employment was that the Plaintiff’s conduct in the video, including the
inappropriate display of his body in a video that was intended for public
viewing, constituted conduct unbecoming of a teacher, who necessarily
is a role model for his students.” 169
Mr. Murmer eventually settled with the Chesterfield County
School Board for $65,000, which was approximately two years’ salary
¶52
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Id. at *43.
Complaint, Murmer v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 2007 WL 2914769 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 4, 2007) (No. 3:07-CV-608).
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WL 638210 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2008) (No. 3:07-CV-608).
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Answer at *5, Murmer v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 2007 WL 3248913
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170
for the position from which Mr. Murmer was fired. ACLU of Virginia
Legal Director Rebecca Glenberg stated, “Our founders recognized that
even controversial speech should be protected in a democracy. The fact
that some administrators were offended by Stephen Murmer’s speech did
not give them the right to fire him.” 171

D. Payne v. Barrow County School District
In a case currently being litigated,172 twenty-four year old
Ashley Payne claims that she was coerced by school administrators into
resigning from her teaching position after they questioned a photograph
and other content posted by Miss Payne on her Facebook page. 173 She
maintains that there was nothing inappropriate, illegal, unethical, or
immoral about the material posted on her Facebook page. 174 The
pictures in question on Ms. Payne’s Facebook page were taken on a
European vacation and depicted her with alcoholic beverages. 175 Of the
pictures, Ms. Payne has stated,
¶53

“I visited the Guinness Brewery, I went to Italy and had wine. I
went to the Temple Bar District of Dublin and drank some alcohol
there like any normal adult would. . . . They’re not even of me
drinking the drinks and I don’t look like I’m intoxicated in any way
176
or doing anything provocative or inappropriate.”

Ms. Payne further stated that her Facebook page was set to
private, she was not Facebook friends with any students or parents, and
she did not know how a parent accessed the photo that led to the loss of
her job. 177

¶54

Ms. Payne had been employed for two years as an English
teacher at Apalachee High School in Barrow County School District

¶55
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American Civil Liberties Union, Fine Art Teacher Wins $65,000 Settlement
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Ms. Payne claims that she was
when she resigned in August of 2009.
“wrongfully coerced” by the principal of Apalachee High School to
resign from her teaching position without “being properly informed of
her legal rights.” 179 Ms. Payne’s employment contract with the Barrow
County School District was for a term, and the contract states that Ms.
Payne can only be terminated for cause.180 On August 27, 2009, Ms.
Payne had a meeting with Mr. McGee, the principal at Apalachee High
School, and according to Ms. Payne, she was not told beforehand what
was to be discussed in the meeting. 181 During that meeting, Mr. McGee
told Ms. Payne that the school district “strongly disapproved of Ms.
Payne’s online activity on the website Facebook. Specifically, Mr.
McGee objected to photos depicting Ms. Payne holding alcoholic
beverages while on vacation, and a status update which used the word
‘bitch’ in a playful manner.” 182 According to Ms. Payne, Mr. McGee
then told her that if she did not resign, her employment would be
suspended, that “any suspension would adversely affect her ability to
teach in the future,” that she “could not win this,” that resignation was
her best option, and that “she had to make her decision before leaving”
the office. 183 Following this conversation, Ms. Payne agreed to resign,
and Mr. McGee’s assistant aided Ms. Payne in drafting her resignation,
“so as to exclude any mention of the true reason Ms. Payne was forced to
resign.” 184
Ms. Payne asserts that Mr. McGee did not disclose to her
information that would have been crucial to her in making a decision
about resigning. Ms. Payne claims that Mr. McGee did not explain that
a suspension could not last for more than ten days and that during a
suspension the school district would continue to pay a suspended
teacher’s salary. 185 Moreover, Ms. Payne asserts that Mr. McGee did not
explain to Ms. Payne that she was “entitled to a statutorily-mandated
hearing specifically designed to protect teachers from being unjustly
suspended without cause.” 186 The Georgia Fair Dismissal Act, O.C.G.A.
¶56
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Heather Darenberg, Barrow County Schools denies forcing teacher to resign,
GWINNETT DAILY POST, Nov. 11, 2009,
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§ 20-2-940, provides that “before the discharge or suspension of a
teacher having a contract of employment for a definite term, a school
district must provide the teacher with written notice of the charges
alleged and a hearing before the local school board to enable the teacher
to contest the charges.” 187
After resigning her position, Ms. Payne became informed of her
legal rights, and her attorney contacted the school district’s attorney on
September 17, 2009 requesting that Ms. Payne be afforded a hearing as
required by the Georgia Fair Dismissal Act, O.C.A. § 20-2-940. 188 The
school district’s counsel responded on September 21, 2009, “stating that
Ms. Payne would not be permitted to rescind her resignation,” and the
district refused to provide Ms. Payne with a hearing. 189 On October 15,
2009, Ms. Payne filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 with the Superior Court of Barrow County, Georgia,
seeking a Writ of Mandamus directing the Barrow County School
District to provide her “with written notice of the charges” that the
school district “has alleged against her and a hearing to contest these
charges pursuant to the Georgia Fair Dismissal Act, O.C.G.A. § 20-2940.” 190 In the Petition, Ms. Payne also seeks a Writ of Mandamus
directing the school district to provide her with “full compensation under
the terms of Ms. Payne’s contract, starting from the date of her
constructive termination on August 27, 2009 and continuing until the
date that the Barrow County School District provides Ms. Payne with the
hearing she is legally entitled to under O.C.G.A. §20-2-940.” 191
¶57

Barrow County School District denies that Ms. Payne was forced
¶58
to resign, claiming that she asked to resign after being informed that she
would be suspended from teaching and reported to the Professional
Standards Committee due to unacceptable content on her Facebook
page. 192 The response the school district filed in Barrow County
Superior Court states that Ms. Payne was “informed that the district
disapproved of her Facebook activity which promoted alcohol use and
contained profanity and which was viewed by a student.” 193 Barrow
187
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County School District maintains that Ms. Payne’s “resignation was
freely and voluntarily submitted.” 194 The school district has denied any
wrongdoing and has filed a demand for dismissal of the case and a
counterclaim for attorney’s fees.195
Following the news stories published about Ms. Payne’s lawsuit,
Mr. McGee, the principal of the school where Ms. Payne worked,
received threatening emails. 196 One of these emails read in part

¶59

What the f---? Firing a teacher because she had a beer in her hand
OUT OF SCHOOL is f----d up dude. I mean, it wasn’t even during
school hours. It was summer. You should think about killing the
parent who complained for they are a raging [expletive]. Then kill
197
yourself. Or should I?

This case illustrates the continuing divide in opinion on this
issue. While there are parents and school officials who believe that
teachers should be disciplined or terminated for appearing in
photographs with alcohol on social networking websites, other members
of the community hold starkly contrasting views.198

¶60

Unlike the previous cases in which the teachers had arguably
¶61
engaged in inappropriate behavior, Ms. Payne does not seem to have
acted inappropriately. 199 Unlike Mr. Spanierman and Ms. Snyder, Ms.
Payne made clear, unequivocal efforts to maintain a separation between
her professional and personal life by using the privacy settings on
Facebook and by not friending or communicating with students or their
parents over social networking websites. Also, unlike Ms. Snyder and
Mr. Murmer, Ms. Payne did not engage in arguably controversial or
provocative behavior. 200 The photographs at issue from Ms. Payne’s
Facebook page show an adult of legal drinking age with an alcoholic
beverage. 201 Ms. Payne is not visibly drunk in the photographs and is
194

Peterson, supra note 195.
Id.
196
Carman Peterson, Principal receives threats after news coverage of former
teacher’s lawsuit, BARROW CNTY. NEWS, Nov. 18, 2009,
http://www.barrowcountynews.com/news/article/5020/.
197
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198
See id.
199
See id.; see also, e.g., Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 299 (D.
Conn. 2008).
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See Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97943
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008); see also Answer at *5, Murmer v. Chesterfield
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 2007 WL 3248913 (E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2007) (No. 3:07cv608).
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202
While it is somewhat easier to see
not wearing provocative clothing.
some fault with the teachers in the other cases, it is nearly impossible to
reasonably conclude that Ms. Payne in any way deserved to suffer
professionally for her use of Facebook. Indeed, the case of Ms. Payne
may be interpreted as a warning to all public school teachers that in order
to ensure that social networking pages do not jeopardize their
employment they should refrain from using them entirely.

V. DISCUSSION AND PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION
A. Discussion
No one has a right to work for the government. 203 By taking a
public sector job, an individual relinquishes some of his or her freedom
of speech. Admittedly, “the First Amendment’s primary aim is the full
protection of speech upon issues of public concern.”204 However, it is
unrealistic to expect newly qualified teachers in their early twenties to
abandon social networking websites when they accept their first teaching
position. One would be hard pressed to find a single recent American
college graduate who has not used MySpace, Facebook, YouTube, or
Twitter. Social networking websites are a part of twenty-first century
American culture, and the law should recognize this. Granted, some of
the teachers in the cases discussed in this iBrief have engaged in
questionable conduct, and schools have an interest in providing positive
role models for students. Teachers are in a position to influence their
students’ behavior, and it is understandable for school boards and parents
to desire teachers to refrain from exhibiting behaviors to students that
their parents do not wish them to emulate. Some of the teachers
discussed in this iBrief could have been more discrete or tactful in their
use of social networking websites; however, punishing teachers for how
they choose to communicate on social networking sites outside of the
workplace allows the morals and values of their community to dictate
their personal lives.
¶62

¶63
As the court noted in Spanierman, not every teacher with a social
networking account is disciplined for their social networking
activities. 205 However, the standards for acceptable use of social
networking sites by teachers are unclear (if existent at all). Indeed, in
Spanierman, the school district focused on Mr. Spanierman’s interaction
with students and ignored the MySpace pages of teachers who were not
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known to communicate with students through online social networks.
Conversely, in the case of Mr. Murmer, his appearance on the social
network website YouTube had no direct connection to his students, and
he was terminated because his appearance on the social networking site
was offensive to school administrators. 207
A number of teachers use Facebook, and many of them regularly
write status updates or wall comments about their work and students.
Given the present state of the law, and the apparent lack of protection for
teacher communications, currently, when public school teachers choose
to write unfavorable comments they risk retribution from their
employers. Although there are risks involved with permitting teachers
and students to communicate using social networking sites, such
interactions should not be entirely forbidden given the benefits
associated with such communications and the social realities of the
time. 208 While communications should not be entirely prohibited, there
should be consequences for inappropriate communications between
teachers and students, as was true in the case with Mr. Spanierman.209
Teachers do not necessarily harm students by communicating with them
on social networking websites. Furthermore, there is no evidence that a
photograph of a teacher in a pirate hat holding a plastic cup harms
kids. 210 As long as teachers keep their social networking website use
personal rather than professional, their employers should take no
disciplinary steps. As a federal district judge in Pennsylvania stated,
“[t]he mere fact that the Internet may be accessed at school does not
authorize school officials to become censors of the world-wide web.
Public Schools are vital institutions, but their reach is not unlimited.”211
Public school teachers should be permitted to act within the parameters
set for employees in the public sector to the extent that employees in the
public sector can post the photographs they choose, list their employer,
and make comments about their work if they feel so inclined. They
should be allowed to appropriately communicate with their students
through social networking sites and other new technologies.

¶64
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B. PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION
¶65
Courts have not had much opportunity to reshape the protections
for public educators to include Internet speech. This iBrief proposes that
school districts not be allowed to consider a public educator’s social
networking website use for disciplinary or employment decisions at all,
unless teachers are inappropriately and directly communicating with their
students.
¶66
This proposal could take effect in a variety of ways, but state
legislation might prove the most effective. State legislation has been
introduced to address students’ off-campus use of social networking
media, and similar legislation could be introduced to provide protection
for public school teachers’ use of social networking media, off-campus
and on their own time. 212 In addition or as an alternative to state
legislation, courts could read the suggested protection into these lawsuits,
or school districts could adopt sensible policies on teacher use of social
networking sites. Such sensible policies would be in contrast to the
policies of school districts that currently have broad, subjective policies
containing language such as “conduct unbecoming of a teacher.” 213

State legislation will likely be the most effective implementation
¶67
of these proposed teacher protections, as it would provide teachers a
uniform protection throughout each state. Asking the courts to keep this
proposal in mind while deciding cases would likely be less effective.
The decision to apply this proposed protection would have to be made in
each jurisdiction. Furthermore, as evidenced by the sparse case law on
this topic, many teachers do not file charges against their school districts
when disciplined or terminated for their use of social networking media,
and therefore a protection only given by courts handling lawsuits would
not help all affected teachers. For the aforementioned reasons, state
legislation will likely be the best means of providing teachers with
protection for their social networking media use. Indeed, state legislation
has been proposed to address the speech of students on social networking
websites, and similar legislation could be used to address the speech of
teachers on social networking websites.214
Until state legislatures address this area of law, school districts
¶68
should at least write clear policies advising teachers on whether they will
view teachers’ social networking website activities, what they would not
212
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want to see on teachers’ social networking profiles, and whether they
would take disciplinary or employment action based upon a teacher’s
social networking website activities.

CONCLUSION
¶69
According to existing law, teachers receive the same speech
protections as other public employees. 215 However, because of their
interaction with parents and students, public school teachers are singled
out from among public employees and held to arbitrary standards of
conduct. 216 Recognizing that teachers are sometimes held to arbitrary
standards of conduct that are not imposed upon other public employees,
the law should provide teachers with special protection. Although it is
reasonable to expect teachers to behave in a professional manner when
they interact with students, it is unreasonable for teachers to be subject to
professional discipline for their private behavior when the conduct for
which they are disciplined is in conformance with all applicable laws.217
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